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Abstract 
We contribute to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature by investigating whether 
the CSR of acquirers impacts mergers and acquisitions (M&A) completion uncertainty. Using 
arbitrage spreads following initial acquisition announcements as a measure of deal 
uncertainty, we document –for an international sample of 726 M&A operations spanning the 
2004-2016 period– a negative association between arbitrage spreads and acquirers’ CSR.  
Specifically, we show arbitrage spreads are reduced by 1.10 percentage points for each 
standard deviation unit-increase in the acquirer’s CSR score. Findings are qualitatively similar 
when we focus on individual CSR dimensions (environmental, social, and governance). Our 
results suggest the CSR of acquirers is an important determinant of the way market 
participants assess the outcome of M&As worldwide. 
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1. Introduction 
Enormous amounts of money flow each year as a result of mergers and acquisitions (M&A, 
henceforth) transactions. In 2016, for example, no less than 48,736 M&A transactions took 
place worldwide, representing an aggregate value of $3.6 trillion, according to the Institute 
for Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances (IMAA)1. These substantial capital flows, coupled with 
M&As’ potential ability to create synergies but also conflicts of interest, render the study of 
M&As important to academics and practitioners. However, not all M&As attempts turn out to 
be successful, which raises the issue of completion risk, i.e., the risk that a deal may not be 
consummated. A deal can fail for a variety of reasons including shareholder opposition, 
regulatory intervention, financing problems or internal target resistance (Parker, 2005). In 
other words, the outcome of a M&A bid depends on the assessment and opinion of many of 
an acquirer’s stakeholders2. As a result, the way a company treats its stakeholders should play 
a role in the expected outcome of M&A deals. 
 A firm’s policies and behaviors towards its stakeholders are often referred to as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR, henceforth). Interest in CSR has been strongly increasing 
for the past two decades, as evidenced by the constantly growing share of companies 
adopting CSR reporting3 and the similarly growing role played by Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) funds4. The substantial increase in CSR awareness has fueled an important 
                                                          
1 Source: https://imaa-institute.org/ 
2 There is no common consensus as to what the concept of a stakeholder means, with hundreds of different 
definitions existing in the literature (Miles, 2012). According to Freeman (1984), stakeholders are “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievements of the organizations objectives”, i.e. shareholders, 
customers, employers, NGOs, governments, communities, etc. 
3 King and Bartels (2015)’s KPMG survey documents that 73 percent of surveyed companies worldwide issued 
CSR reporting in 2015 (a 32 percentage point increase relative to 2005), and that CSR reporting was undertaken 
by 92 percent of the world’s largest 250 companies. 
4 According to the US SIF Foundation's 2016 Report on Sustainable and Responsible Investing Trends in the 
United States, more than one out of every five dollars under professional management in the United States –
$8.72 trillion or more– was invested according to SRI strategies as of year-end 2015. This represents a 33-
percent increase since 2014. 
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body of academic research on the financial consequences of CSR. Recent studies show that 
CSR impacts the market value of firms (Buchanan et al., 2018; Fauver et al., 2018; Ferrell et 
al., 2016; Gao and Zhang, 2015; Jiao, 2010; Lins et al., 2017; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013), the 
cost of capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al, 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Ng 
and Rezaee, 2015), the financial risk of companies (Kim et al., 2014; Diemont et al., 2016) and 
the value of cash holdings (Arouri and Pijourlet, 2017; Cheung, 2016; Ghaly et al., 2015). 
However, existing research work has yet to achieve consensus, and whether shareholders’ 
interests are consistent with those of other stakeholders is still an open question that 
deserves further empirical analysis. 
 In this study, we specifically examine whether the CSR of acquirers impacts the 
uncertainty preceding M&A deal completion, and thus contribute to the thin literature 
studying CSR in the M&A context. Indeed, while there is considerable research focusing on 
M&A on the one side, and on the relationship between CSR and capital markets on the other 
side, the association between CSR and M&A is scarcely analyzed. This is surprising as M&A 
operations offer an excellent platform to better understand the financial impacts of CSR 
activities. Unlike day-to-day operating decisions, M&As potentially create positive synergies 
but also substantial financial and operational risks that may affect all stakeholders (Burns and 
Collett, 2017). Identifying the determinants of M&A uncertainty is therefore crucial for both 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 There are reasons suggesting CSR should have an impact on deal-related uncertainty. 
On the one hand, proponents of stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 
1984; Porter and Kramer, 2006) suggest that ethical behavior and profit are not mutually 
exclusive and that acting in all stakeholders’ interests ultimately benefits shareholders. 
According to this view, high CSR companies should benefit from stronger stakeholders 
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commitment thanks to an increased reputation for delivering on their implicit contracts5.  
Indeed, strong CSR attributes should reduce the probability of a breach in implicit contracts 
and firms that have high CSR should therefore receive stronger stakeholders’ support (i.e., 
from employees, capital providers, and authorities). This is especially important within the 
context of unsettling events such as M&As. As a result, M&As conducted by high-CSR 
acquirers should embed less uncertainty than operations initiated by low-CSR acquirers, and 
this lower uncertainty should result in reduced completion uncertainty.  On the other hand, 
the neoclassical paradigm (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2001; Levitt, 1958) views CSR-related 
expenditures as a waste of valuable resources resulting in benefits enjoyed by non-financial 
stakeholders at the expense of shareholders. Following this view, M&As conducted by high-
CSR acquirers should be characterized by more uncertainty than operations initiated by low-
CSR acquirers because of increased risk of shareholder opposition and reduced access to 
capital.  
 In this paper, we contribute to the open debate on the capital market consequences 
of CSR activities and evaluate these two opposite views by empirically assessing the impact of 
acquirer’s CSR on M&A completion uncertainty, proxied by arbitrage spreads, using an 
international sample of 726 deals spanning the 2004-2016 period. Our measure of acquirer’s 
CSR comes from ASSET4 – Thomson Reuters ESG Research Data. Our main findings offer 
strong evidence that M&A completion uncertainty is negatively related to the CSR of 
acquirers. Indeed, we find that a one-standard deviation increase in the acquirer’s CSR score 
reduces the deal’s arbitrage spread by 1.10 percentage points. Results are qualitatively similar 
                                                          
5 Corporations represent a nexus of implicit and explicit contracts between shareholders and stakeholders 
(Coase, 1937; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Explicit contracts refer to those contracts 
that have legal binding whereas implicit contracts have no legal binding. For implicit contracts, firms can miss 
their promise without being sued by other stakeholders. The value of implicit contracts depends on trust. High-
CSR firms tend to have the reputation of being trustworthy and reliable; and are therefore expected to commit 
to implicit contracts (Kristoffersen et al., 2005; Liang et al., 2017). 
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when we focus on individual CSR dimensions (environmental, social, and governance). Our 
evidence is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including alternative proxies of completion 
uncertainty, alternative sample specifications, and various approaches to address potential 
endogeneity. Our findings support arguments in the literature in favor of stakeholder theory. 
 To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first international study that examines 
the effect of CSR on M&A completion uncertainty. Our paper is related to the literature that 
analyzes CSR within the M&A context6. The paper closest to ours is Deng et al. (2013), who 
study a sample of US merger deals and find that M&A operations by high CSR acquirers take 
less time to complete and are less likely to fail than M&A operations by low CSR acquirers. 
They also show that high CSR acquirers realize higher merger announcement returns, higher 
announcement returns on the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target, and 
larger increases in post-merger long-term operating performance. We advance this strand of 
the literature in several ways. First and foremost, while Deng et al. (2013) focus on US 
transactions, we take an international perspective. This international perspective is 
particularly important when studying the M&A-CSR link. Indeed, from a firm perspective, the 
motivation underlying the adoption of CSR is not straightforward. As Liang and Renneboog 
(2017) argue, it is not clear whether firms “do well by doing good”, or “do good by doing 
well”. In addition, the authors emphasize that CSR is not necessarily a purely voluntary 
initiative and that CSR adoption depends on legal rules, institutional arrangements and 
societal preferences. As such, to study the impact of CSR, it is important to consider firms 
across different countries. What’s more, the volume of North American deals7 as a proportion 
of global M&A activity has fallen from 90.2% of global M&A activity (in US$ value) in 1985 to 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Aktas et al. (2011), Bereskin et al. (2018), Boone and Uysal (2018), Deng et al. (2013), Gomes 
and Marsat (2018), and Liang et al. (2017). 
7 Deals in which the target firm was located in North America. 
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51.3% in 20168. This trend towards increased internationalization of corporate combinations 
raises the need to take an international perspective when studying M&A. We exploit the 
richness of our M&A dataset and study our research question in an international framework. 
Second, as Fransen (2013) highlights, it is important to examine the various dimensions of CSR 
separately rather than only focus on the concept as a whole. Therefore, in addition to the 
overall CSR, we also analyze the environmental, social, and governance dimensions 
individually.  Third, while Deng et al. (2013) analyze the impact of CSR on the observed 
probability of completion and time to completion, we use a related and intuitive measure of 
completion risk, i.e., arbitrage spreads. In finance, most research studies rely on ex post risk 
instead of ex ante risk as the latter is more difficult to estimate. The ex ante risk is an opinion 
about risk formed at the time the decision is made and thus incorporated by investors in their 
decision-making calculations.  The ex post risk is often a biased proxy of ex ante risk as the 
latter may reflect fears of adverse events that did not materialize (Jorion and Goetzmann, 
1999). Fortunately, the M&A process offers a framework in which ex ante completion risk is 
readily observable through arbitrage spreads. The arbitrage spread is the difference between 
the offer price (to be paid in cash and/or in acquirer’s stock) and the market price of the 
target immediately following the M&A announcement. This spread provides us with an 
excellent proxy for ex ante uncertainty as it conveys market expectations regarding a deal’s 
expected outcome (Jindra and Walkling, 2004). In this sense, it gives us insight into what the 
market thinks of the chances of a deal succeeding. Using arbitrage spreads as a measure of 
completion risk allows us to evaluate directly how market participants perceive CSR in the 
M&A context and to examine whether investors actually price the impact of CSR on M&A risk. 
                                                          
8 Source: https://imaa-institute.org/ 
 6 
 
Fourth, we explicitly control for target’s CSR in additional tests to make sure the impact of 
acquirers’ CSR on deal uncertainty does not depend on target’s CSR performance.  
Also related to our study is Liang et al. (2017) who investigate the impact of acquirers’ 
engagement in employee issues in the M&A context.  Our study differs from theirs in two 
important ways. First, while Liang et al. (2017) analyze M&A wealth effects, we focus on M&A 
completion uncertainty. Second, we do not focus only on employee relations but consider all 
dimensions of CSR (environment, social, and governance).  
Finally, our study also contributes to the literature on the determinants of merger 
arbitrage spreads by showing that the CSR attributes of acquirers matter in explaining the 
cross-sectional variance of arbitrage spreads. 
 The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the concept of 
risk arbitrage, the related literature, and motivates how an acquirer’s CSR activities may 
impact M&A completion uncertainty. Section 3 describes the data and provides summary 
statistics for the different variables we use. Section 4 presents empirical results, and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Risk arbitrage, corporate social responsibility, and M&A uncertainty 
This section serves three purposes. First, we review previous research studies on M&A and 
risk-arbitrage. Second, we discuss the main findings of research works on CSR. Finally, we 
relate the two previous literatures and motivate how CSR can be expected to impact M&A 
uncertainty. 
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2.1. M&A and risk-arbitrage 
When an acquisition bid is announced, the market stock price of the acquiring firm usually 
goes down while the market stock price of the target firm usually adjusts upward without 
exactly reaching the level of the offer price (to be paid in cash and/or stock of the acquiring 
firm). The difference between the target stock price immediately following the acquisition 
announcement and the offer price is called the speculation or arbitrage spread. Arbitrage 
spreads are theoretically set conditional on the features of a particular acquisition and 
anticipating the outcome of the offer. While the bid price provides information about the 
bidder’s valuation of the target, the arbitrage spread conveys information about the market’s 
pricing of the target conditional on the existence of the bid (Jindra and Walkling, 2004). The 
arbitrage spread can therefore be seen as a result from wagers on the expected outcome of 
the operation by market participants: the greater the perceived risk of failure, the wider the 
arbitrage spread. 
Risk arbitrage (sometimes called merger arbitrage) –for which investors seem to have 
been regaining interest recently9– is the investment strategy aimed at profiting from this 
spread. In the case where the bid is successful, the arbitrageur pockets the arbitrage spread. 
However, if the deal fails, the arbitrageur suffers a loss usually much greater than the profit 
realized if the deal succeeds. For risk-arbitrageurs, the appropriate positions to undertake 
depend on the deal consideration structure. In cash bids, the acquirer offers to exchange cash 
for the target’s equity. In this case, the arbitrageur simply purchases the target company’s 
stock and earns the arbitrage spread if the offer eventually succeeds. In stock bids (all-stock 
or stock-and-cash deals), the arbitrageur still purchases the target company’s stock but also 
sells short a given amount of the acquirer’s stock. 
                                                          
9 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/hedge-fund-investors-have-fallen-in-love-with-
merger-arb-again 
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Several reasons have been suggested to explain risk arbitrage returns. Larcker and Lys 
(1987) view risk arbitrage returns as a compensation for the cost of acquiring valuable private 
information while Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) see them as a compensation for providing 
liquidity, especially in bear markets. Generally speaking, the main risk in merger arbitrage is 
completion risk, i.e., the risk that the deal ultimately fails. Other risks relate to the uncertainty 
surrounding the deal terms and the time to consummate the deal (Brown and Raymond, 
1986). As risk arbitrage profits are considered a reward for bearing these risks, any change in 
these risks will also affect the arbitrage spread (Baker and Savoglu, 2002). 
Researchers have attempted to explain the cross-sectional variations of arbitrage 
spreads and to find their determinants. Jindra and Walkling (2004) are the first to explore this 
subject. They analyze a sample of 362 US cash tender offers spanning the 1981-1995 period 
and find that arbitrage spreads are significantly associated with various bid and offer 
characteristics. They also show arbitrage spreads are positively related to offer duration and 
negatively related to the magnitude of price revisions. Branch and Wang (2008) analyze a 
comprehensive sample of 1,223 announced deal attempts occurring between 1995 and 2005 
and find characteristics such as bid premia, arbitrageurs’ involvement and target’s relative 
size have an impact on arbitrage spreads. More recently, Jetley and Ji (2010) investigate the 
decline of risk-arbitrage returns over the 1990-2007 period and find that all-cash transactions 
are usually associated with narrower spreads because these transactions are less risky. 
 
2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility 
There are two conflicting views regarding CSR: the shareholder view and the stakeholder 
view. The shareholder view is rooted in neoclassical economic theory according to which the 
sole responsibility of managers is to maximize profit (Friedman, 1970) while social and 
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environmental issues should be resolved by the market itself, within the boundaries of what is 
permitted by regulation and, falling that, by the government. In the same vein, Levitt (1958) 
criticizes beyond-compliance actions by firms and considers that the only responsibilities of 
businesses are “to obey the elementary canons of everyday face-to-face civility and to seek 
material gain”. According to this view, CSR-related expenditures are seen as a waste of 
valuable resources that should instead be employed to maximize firm value. In this case, 
benefits that other stakeholders get from CSR activities come at the expense of shareholder 
wealth, resulting in a wealth transfer from shareholders to other stakeholders. 
The stakeholder view claims that “corporate success and social welfare are not a zero-
sum game” (Porter and Kramer, 2006), and that CSR-related activities increase stakeholders’ 
support towards a firm’s operations and therefore ultimately benefit shareholders. As 
pointed out by Deng et al. (2013), this view is closely related to contract theory (Coase, 1937) 
according to which a firm is a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts between shareholders 
and other stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Implicit contracts are not legally 
binding and there is no explicit cost involved in not honoring them (Kristoffersen et al., 2005). 
Therefore, they carry a high amount of uncertainty and their value is thus contingent on 
stakeholders’ expectations regarding the firm’s willingness to honor its commitments (Cornell 
and Shapiro, 1987). 
CSR activities are often associated with a stronger reputation (Martinez-Ferrero et al., 
2016) and a stronger commitment to honor implicit contracts (Deng et al., 2013). This 
stronger reputation in turn can increase the ability to attract financial capital (Cheng et al., 
2014), the appeal to current and potential employees (Fombrun et al., 2000; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006) and customer loyalty (Fombrun et al., 2000). It can also lead to more 
attractive contract terms with strategic partners, mainly as a result of improved trust (Barney 
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and Hansen, 1994) and the ability to price products and services less aggressively (Fombrun et 
al., 2000). 
Trust is particularly important in the context of uncertain event like M&As. These 
events are likely to unsettle key stakeholders because they challenge the continuity of 
existing long-term relationships between the firm and stakeholders and can in some cases 
require stakeholders to renegotiate their contracts with the new combined entity (Deng et al., 
2013). As a result, a firm’s reputation for honoring its implicit commitments to stakeholders is 
a key determinant of a combination’s success. This also explains why firms considering 
alliance projects are more attracted by prospective partners perceived as trustworthy (Shah 
and Swaminathan, 2008). 
 
2.3. CSR and uncertainty surrounding M&A deals 
According to the stakeholder view, strong CSR attributes should reduce the probability of a 
breach in implicit contracts and therefore increase stakeholders’ support towards a firm. Also, 
a firm’s commitment to explicit and implicit contracts with key stakeholders plays an 
important role in the wealth gains of acquiring firms’ shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 
1988; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008; Masulis et al., 2016; Liang et al., 2017). As a result, 
acquirers’ shareholders should be less likely to oppose deals conducted by high-CSR firms. In 
addition, target’s stakeholders could also protest and lobby against a takeover conducted by 
an acquirer perceived as socially irresponsible (low-CSR acquirer), potentially convincing the 
board to consider alternatives to the takeover (Liang et al., 2017). In addition, negative 
reputation spillovers from the acquirer resulting from a low CSR commitment would decrease 
the value of the target firm relative to other acquirers without a negative reputation (Boone 
and Uysal, 2018). The target firm should therefore be more inclined to oppose a M&A 
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attempt coming from a low-CSR bidder. Finally, high-CSR acquirers could also enjoy a better 
reputation among regulators (Hong and Liskovich, 2015), reducing the risk of regulatory 
intervention during the M&A process. Therefore, mergers and acquisitions conducted by high 
CSR acquirers should embed less uncertainty than operations initiated by low CSR acquirers. 
This fact has been validated empirically in the US context. Indeed, Deng et al. (2013) find that 
mergers initiated by high-CSR acquirers take less time to complete and are less likely to fail 
than mergers initiated by low-CSR acquirers. They emphasize the fact that “high CSR acquirers 
effectively reduce the conflicts of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders by 
improving the welfare of both parties”, leading to faster integration. Similarly, Hawn (2013) 
focuses on emerging markets and studies the importance of CSR in the expansion of 
multinational companies through corporate acquisitions and finds that strong CSR (by 
acquirers) leads to faster deal completion, implying that CSR advantage actually overcomes 
home country disadvantage. This is a fundamental point as arbitrageurs must not only predict 
the outcome of a transaction but must also estimate the time to completion. Indeed, if a deal 
takes significantly longer to complete than anticipated, the rate of return will decline to 
uneconomic levels. As a result, strong CSR by the acquirer can be expected to reduce M&A 
uncertainty. Increased stakeholders’ support should also reduce acquisition-related 
uncertainty through the channel of deal financing. In cash transactions, the ability to finance 
the purchase of the target may in certain circumstances create substantial risks to deal 
completion. As noted by Paulson (in Parker, 2005), while all buyers are confident about their 
ability to raise the money at the time of announcement, a rise in interest rates, an earnings 
decline in either the target or the acquirer, or a declining stock market may all cause financing 
difficulties. A strong CSR could limit this problem through its negative effect on the cost of 
capital resulting from a large relative size of the firm’s investor base and low perceived risks 
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(El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2016). This reduction in 
financing risk could in turn lead to lower uncertainties and narrower spreads. 
In contrast to this view, the advocates of the shareholder view suggest that CSR-
related activities benefit other stakeholders at the expense of shareholders. In this context, 
mergers and acquisitions could be perceived as benefiting other stakeholders at the expense 
of shareholder wealth, thereby leading shareholders to vote against the deal proposal and 
delaying (or even blocking) completion. In addition, according to the agency view of CSR 
(Jensen, 2001), managers cannot maximize more than one objective function at the same 
time. Jensen (2001) claims that without a single and clearly stated corporate objective – 
which should be shareholder wealth maximization – self-interested managers have greater 
latitude to pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders’. Also, the over-
investment hypothesis of Barnea and Rubin (2010) argues that managers may seek to 
overinvest in CSR-related activities for their private benefit. They could indeed strategically 
commit themselves to socially responsible activities aimed at gaining stakeholders’ support to 
ultimately strengthen their own position within the firm (entrenchment strategy). This 
behavior is detrimental to shareholder wealth, and such firms should therefore exhibit a 
higher cost of capital, reducing their financing capabilities and weakening their acquisition 
power. These features should lead to a higher uncertainty surrounding deal completions. 
The nature of the impact of CSR on M&A uncertainty is therefore an empirical 
question. We address this question in the remainder of this paper. 
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3. Data 
3.1. Sample selection 
Our sample consists of international bids (successful and unsuccessful) announced between 
2004 and 2016. The initial sample of deals comes from Thomson Financial's Securities Data 
Company (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all bids that meet the following 
five selection criteria: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $1 million, (2) the 
acquirer initially owns less than 50% of the target firm and seeks to acquire more than 50% of 
the target firm, (3) the acquirer and target are publicly traded and have financial data 
available from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database, (4) the acquirer is rated by 
ASSET4, and (5) bids have standard terms, i.e., they do not feature contingent claims in the 
form of embedded options.  These restrictions result in a final sample of 726 deal offers. 
 
3.2. Measure of arbitrage spread 
Arbitrage spreads are computed one day after the offer announcement date (Jetley and Ji, 
2010). For cash deals, risk arbitrage involves buying the stock of the target after the merger 
has been announced and in this case, the arbitrage spread is computed as follows: 
 
         (1) 
 
where  is the arbitrage spread for a cash deal on trading day t,  is the 
price in cash offered by the acquiring company for each share of the target company’s 
common stock and  is the closing price of the target company’s common stock on 
trading day t. 
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For stock deals (i.e., mergers in which target shareholders receive shares of the 
acquiring firm), risk arbitrage involves buying one share of the target firm and short selling a 
given number of shares of the acquiring firm according to the exchange ratio (i.e., the number 
of shares of the acquiring firm’s common stock offered in exchange for one share of the 
target firm’s common stock). In this case, the arbitrage spread is computed as follows: 
 
        (2) 
 
where  is the arbitrage spread for stock deals on trading day t,  is 
the closing price of the acquiring firm’s common stock on trading day t, ER is the exchange 
ratio i.e., the number of shares of the acquirer’s common stock offered to the target’s 
common shareholders in exchange for one share of the target’s common stock and  is 
the closing price of the target company’s common stock on trading day t. 
 
3.3. Measure of a firm’s CSR 
To proxy for CSR, we use the data provided by ASSET4 Thomson Reuters ESG Research Data. 
The ASSET4 ESG database has a reputation as one of the most diligent and trustworthy 
sources for CSR data (Stellner et al., 2015). It includes 5,000 global publicly listed companies 
and provides history up to fiscal year 2002 for close to 1,000 companies. The overall rating is 
based on approximately 700 individual data points, which are combined into over 250 key 
performance indicators (KPIs). These KPI scores are aggregated into a framework of 18 
categories grouped within 4 dimensions (Economic, Environmental, Social, and Governance) 
that are integrated into a single overall score using equal weighting. In year t, a firm receives a 
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z-score for each of the pillars, benchmarking its performance against the rest of the firms 
based on all the information available in fiscal year t-1 (by construction, this variable is lagged 
by one year). The resulting percentage is therefore a relative measure of performance, z-
scored and normalized to be comprised between 0 and 100%. We follow Cheng et al. (2014) 
and Stellner et al. (2015) and compute a firm’s overall CSR score by averaging the scores 
assigned to the environment, social, and governance dimensions. In this study, we use for 
each deal the last available ASSET4 ESG score before the announcement date. 
 
3.4. Other variables influencing arbitrage spreads 
To investigate the relation between acquirer’s CSR and arbitrage spreads and make sure our 
CSR measure does not proxy for other known factors that influence arbitrage spreads (Branch 
and Yang, 2003; Branch and Wang, 2008; Cornelli and Li, 2001; Hoffmeister and Dyl, 1981; 
Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993; Jetley and Ji, 2010; Jindra and Walkling, 2004; Walkling, 1985), 
we include several firm and deal-related controls in our regressions. Specifically, we include 
the bid premium, the target’s cumulative return prior to deal announcement, abnormal 
trading volume around announcement, acquirer size, target size, the target’s market-to-book 
ratio, the acquirer’s Tobin Q and previous market-adjusted return.   We also include variables 
that can be thought of as being related to the propensity of firms to invest in CSR activities 
such as firm age, financial performance (return on asset), or other investment/expenses 
potentially linked to CSR due to limited resource availability such as capital expenditures, R&D 
expenses, and advertising expenses (Campbell, 2007; Shane and Spicer, 1983; Sun and Gunia, 
2018; Teoh et al., 1999; Withisuphakorn and Jiraporn, 2016). Finally, we include a set of deal-
specific characteristics (cash dummy, hostile dummy, cross-border dummy, diversifying 
dummy, toehold dummy and multiple bids dummy). We winsorize all financial variables at the 
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1% and 99% level10. Table A1 in the appendix provides the full description, calculation method 
and predicted sign of the relationship with arbitrage spreads for the control variables. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Distribution of the sample and arbitrage spreads 
Table 1 shows the yearly-partitioned distribution of deals and arbitrage spreads for our 
sample of 726 deals over the 2004-2016 period. The majority of deals are clustered in more 
recent years with about 70% of offers taking place in or after 2010. The percentage of deals 
associated with negative arbitrages spreads ranges from 11.11% in 2005 to 38.10% in 2010. 
Over the whole sample period, the number of cases with negative arbitrage spreads accounts 
for 24.93% of our observations. Among the 726 deals, 529 deals (73%) were eventually 
successful and the remaining 197 deals (27%) ultimately failed. In terms of deal structure, 
57% of deals involve a cash-only payment while the remaining 43% are cash-and-stock or 
stock-only offers. The number of hostile bids is relatively low with only 47 observations 
(3.6%). Finally, our sample comprises 286 cross-border deals (39%). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Our sample is geographically diverse with 45 countries involved. Table 2 shows a detailed 
distribution of deal offers across countries along with their values for the top 20 target and 
acquiring countries based on the number of deal offers. Not surprisingly, the United States 
are by far the most active market over the sample period, both as an acquirer and as a target, 
with 294 offers as acquirer (totaling $2,437 billion) and 325 offers as target (totaling $2,647 
billion). Australia, Canada, France, Japan and the UK are the other main countries involved in 
                                                          
10 To check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of outliers, we also conduct our tests without 
winsorizing. Results are similar and are available upon request. 
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deal attempts, both as acquirers and targets (with these countries cumulatively totaling 
$1,185 billion as acquirers and $962 billion as targets).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2. Summary statistics results 
Table 3 reports summary statistics related to our set of variables. The mean and median 
arbitrage spreads are 3.70% and 2.20% respectively, with a standard deviation of 7.10%. The 
average acquiring firm in our sample has a CSR score of 59.90% and a market-to-book ratio of 
3.20. The average premium offered for the target is 34.30%.  Correlations among these 
explanatory variables are reported in Table 4. None of our variables are highly correlated, 
ruling out potential multicollinearity issues. Interestingly, the correlation between arbitrage 
spreads and acquirers’ CSR scores is significantly negative. In addition, we see that arbitrage 
spreads are positively correlated with the bid premium, and negatively correlated with the 
target’s cumulative returns and acquirer size. These facts are in line with what we described 
above. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.3. Multivariate analysis of the link between CSR and M&A uncertainty 
As discussed in the introduction, despite increased academic interest in CSR and a 
large volume of research on M&A, we still know very little about how CSR relates to M&A risk. 
The purpose of our study is to address this gap in the literature by empirically examining the 
link between acquirers’ CSR and M&A arbitrage spreads. To assess the impact of acquirers’ 
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CSR on M&A perceived uncertainty, we regress the arbitrage spread on a measure of 
acquirer’s CSR and the set of control variables previously described. Our main model is as 
follows11: 
 
    (3) 
 
where AcqCSRi is the acquirer’s CSR score and Controls is a vector of control variables 
(introduced in section 3.4. and described in Table A1 of the appendix). , , and  represent 
year, industry, and country fixed-effects, respectively12. In order to better assess how the CSR 
of acquirers impacts the arbitrage spread, we test the overall CSR score as well as the scores 
for each ASSET4 CSR dimensions, namely Environment, Social, and Governance. AcqCSR is the 
acquirer’s overall CSR score in column 1 of Table 5, the acquirer’s environmental score 
(AcqENV) in column 2, the social score (AcqSOC) in column 3, and the governance score 
(AcqGOV) in column 4. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we perform Ramsey’s 
(1969) Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) for omitted variables. Results fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of no omitted variable, and therefore suggest our model does not suffer 
from this misspecification. 
Table 6 presents our results. In column 1, we run our main model using the overall 
ASSET4 CSR score as our CSR measure. The coefficient associated with AcqCSR is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that arbitrage spreads are negatively 
related to the acquirer’s CSR. More precisely, the coefficient associated with the acquirer’s 
                                                          
11 In unreported tests, we also specify a model including a squared CSR term to account for potential non-
linearity in the relationship between CSR and arbitrage spreads. We find no evidence of non-linear association. 
12 Using country and year dummies assumes that whatever is going on in a given year affects all of the countries 
the same. To make sure this assumption is acceptable, we also run our model using country-year fixed effects. 
Results are similar under this specification and are available upon request. 
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CSR, AcqCSR is -0.046 (t-statistic = -2.92). Descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 report 
that the standard deviation of AcqCSR is 0.240. Therefore, the regression coefficient implies 
that arbitrage spreads are reduced by 1.10 percentage points for each standard deviation 
unit-increase in the acquirer’s CSR score.13 For a target valued at $100 million, a one-standard 
deviation increase in acquirer CSR would result in a $1.1 million decrease in the arbitrage 
spread’s dollar-value, which can be seen as the completion uncertainty expressed in terms of 
potential market capitalization, or the amount to be monetized by risk-arbitrage investors. 
This 1.10-percentage point reduction amounts to approximately 30% of the average arbitrage 
spread (3.73%), making it economically significant. In addition, we also test scores for each 
individual CSR dimension, namely Environment, Social, and Governance. Results are 
presented in columns 2 to 4 and show that each CSR dimension is negatively related to 
arbitrage spreads at usual significance levels (5%). In terms of economic interpretation, 
results imply that an increase of one standard deviation in the acquirer’s environmental, 
social, and governance performance, are associated with a reduction in arbitrage spreads of 
0.84, 0.92, and 0.75 percentage points, respectively14. 
Coefficients associated with control variables are mostly in line with what we expected. 
Similar to Jindra and Walkling (2004), we find that the bid premium is positively linked to 
arbitrage spreads, whereas target’s cumulative price return and deal hostility decrease 
arbitrage spreads. An increase in target’s share price before the announcement as measured 
by cumulative price return can be an indicator of shifts in ownership distribution, which is 
associated with increased speculative activity, the accumulation of shares in more neutral 
                                                          
13 1.10 percentage points represents the product of the coefficient associated with acquirer’s CSR reported in 
column 1 of Table 5 and the standard deviation of acquirer’s CSR reported in Table 3 or -0.046 multiplied by 
0.240, respectively. 
14 In additional tests, we replace AcqCSR by a dummy variable taking the value of one for high CSR acquirers (i.e., 
acquirers with a CSR score located above the median of our sample). Results remain strong and robust. They are 
available upon request. 
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hands, and therefore a decrease in arbitrage spreads (Jindra and Walkling, 2004). Hostile 
deals are often associated with multiple bidders, target resistance and a higher likelihood of 
bid revision, thereby decreasing spreads (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993). In contrast to Jindra 
and Walking (2004) who find abnormal volume and toehold are negatively related to 
arbitrage spreads, we find they are insignificant. In a recent study, Buehlmaier and Zechner 
(2017) study how returns of merger arbitrage spread are determined by content of media 
and find that the bid premium, acquirer’s size and cash flow, and target’s size and market-to-
book ratio do not significantly impact arbitrage spread. In contrast to Buehlmaier and Zechner 
(2017), we find that the bid premium, target’s size and market-to-book ratio are positively 
associated with arbitrage spreads while acquirer’s size is negatively linked to arbitrage 
spreads. As target’s size and valuation increase, so do target’s resources to oppose the 
attempt (Hoffmeister and Dyl, 1981) and because the probability of takeover success 
therefore decreases, arbitrage spreads should be wider as a result. Regarding acquirer size, 
larger acquirers might be able to hire prestigious underwriters whose expertise allows them 
to estimate the offer price maximizing the probability of success, thereby decreasing 
arbitrage spreads. In addition, large acquirers may enjoy an easier access to capital, reducing 
deal financing uncertainty and therefore reducing arbitrage spreads. Although some 
coefficients associated with our controls may differ in terms of statistical significance from 
those available in the extant literature, the signs of these coefficients are consistent with 
those predicted by theory. The difference in statistical significance between our results and 
the extant literature is mainly due to sample differences including period, countries, and 
model specifications. Our sample period is from 2004 to 2016 covering 45 countries, Jindra 
and Walking (2004)’s sample is from 1981 to 1995 covering only US firms, and Buehlmaier 
and Zechner (2017) focus on US firms from 1999 to 2009. In addition, cash deals, and deals 
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involving multiple bidders appear to be associated with narrower arbitrage spreads, again 
confirming the expected association. Acquirer proxies of management quality (Tobin’s Q and 
previous market-adjusted return) as well as other acquirer characteristics (ROA, CAPEX, Cash 
flows, R&D, advertising and age) do not appear to have an influence. The cross-border nature 
of deals does not seem to impact arbitrage spreads. Overall, our results suggest that more 
socially responsible firms are perceived by the market as more capable of successfully and 
timely completing mergers and acquisitions15.  
To confirm this interpretation and make sure the findings of Deng et al. (2013) are 
robust across countries, we follow their methodology and analyze the impact of CSR on the 
probability of deal completion using Probit regression in which the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the deal is completed and zero otherwise. Results are 
reported in Table 6 and show that the probability of completion increases with the acquirer’s 
CSR score. Analyzing individual dimensions, we report that environmental performance 
(column 2) and social performance (column 3) are both positively associated with the 
probability of deal completion while governance (column 4) has no impact. Overall, these 
results suggest that CSR affects the likelihood of deal completion and that market participants 
anticipate this as evidenced by smaller merger arbitrage spreads. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 
                                                          
15 To further control for country or institutional factors, we also run our model focusing on US deals only. Results 
are not materially different under this specification and are not reported due to limited space. They are available 
upon request. 
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4.4. Robustness tests 
4.4.1. Alternative measure of M&A uncertainty 
Arbitrage spreads are usually computed one day after deal announcement. However, 
following Branch and Wang (2008), we also test the arbitrage spread two days after 
announcement in order to allow the market more time to absorb the deal-related 
information fully. Results are reported in column 1 of Table 7 and confirm the negative 
relationship between acquirers’ CSR and M&A uncertainty, albeit at a slightly lower level of 
significance (5%). 
 
4.4.2. Accounting for the financial crisis 
Our sample comprises various deals initiated during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. It is 
therefore possible that our results could be biased by particular behaviors characterizing 
periods of economic distress. In addition, if the impact of CSR on firms is more salient during 
periods of market stress (Lins et al., 2017), including deals announced over this crisis period 
could results in misestimating the impact of CSR on arbitrage spreads. In this sub-section, we 
control for this potential issue by removing from our sample all deals announced during the 
financial crisis period as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), i.e., 
ranging from December 2007 to June 2009. There are 56 deals in our sample that were 
announced during this period. We remove them and re-estimate our model. Results are 
presented in column 2 of Table 7 and confirm the negative and statistically significant (at the 
1% level) relationship between acquirer’s CSR and M&A uncertainty. 
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4.4.3. Removing financial firms 
Several papers (Jindra and Walkling, 2004; Deng et al., 2013) exclude financial firms from their 
investigations as financial industries have different reporting policies and are subject to 
different regulations. To make sure our results are not biased by the inclusion of financial 
firms, we remove deals involving financial firms and re-estimate our model. The exclusion of 
financial industry deals reduces the sample size by 122 deals. Results are reported in column 
3 of Table 7. Again, acquirer’s CSR appears to bear a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with arbitrage spreads, confirming our previous conclusions. 
 
4.4.4. Excluding negative arbitrage spreads 
In this sub-section, we remove from our sample the deals that exhibit negative arbitrage 
spreads. Negative arbitrage spreads may be less intuitive to understand. In fact, they occur as 
a result of increased speculation regarding the possibility of an offer price revision by the 
current bidder, or an expected higher offer coming from a competitive bidder. This, in turn, 
could bias our results by adding to the conditional pricing of the deal an extra layer of 
speculation on top of the assessment of completion risk. Removing these deals reduces our 
sample to 545 deals. Results are reported in column 4 of Table 7, and confirm our previous 
findings. Indeed, the association between acquirer’s CSR and arbitrage spreads remains 
negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level). 
 
4.4.5. Excluding US deals 
The US are the largest covered country and US deals account for a significant proportion 
(33%) of our sample (237 out of 726 deals). In order to address a potential sample bias and 
make sure our results are not driven by the US, we remove these US deals from our sample. 
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The exclusion of those deals reduces the sample size to 489 observations. Results are 
reported in column 5 of Table 7. Again, acquirer’s CSR appears to bear a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with arbitrage spreads (at the 1% level). 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.4.6. Accounting for target’s CSR 
Recent studies show that CSR similarity between acquirer and target can have an impact on 
M&A operations. For example, Bereskin et al. (2018) find that firms that are similar in terms 
of CSR are more likely to merge and that these mergers are associated with greater synergies, 
superior long-run operating performance, and fewer goodwill impairments. Lee et al. (2018) 
reach similar conclusions focusing on human capital relatedness while Boone and Uysal 
(2018) show similar findings by analyzing the environmental dimension. Target’s stand-alone 
CSR could also have an influence on arbitrage spreads. Indeed, as shown by Cumming et al. 
(2016), manipulation (which can be thought of as the negative of CSR) by target insiders can 
increase the risk of deal withdrawal. In light of these elements, target’s CSR policies could also 
play a role in driving deal completion uncertainty. In order to make sure our results are not 
biased by the omission of target’s CSR data, we include target’s CSR score in our model: 
 
  (4) 
 
where AcqCSRi is the acquirer’s CSR score, TarCSRi is the target’s CSR score and Controls is a 
vector of control variables (introduced in section 3.4. and described in Table A1 of the 
appendix). , , and  represent year, industry, and country fixed-effects, respectively. The 
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additional requirement of having CSR data for both the acquirer and target reduces our 
sample size from 726 to 404 deals. Results are presented in Table 8 and confirm our previous 
findings in that acquirer’s CSR remains negatively related to arbitrage spreads at conventional 
statistical significance levels while target’s CSR does not seem to have an impact16. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4.4.7. Accounting for endogeneity 
One could argue that endogeneity could be a concern in this context. First of all, our 
dependent variable, i.e., the arbitrage spread, includes the offer price made by the acquirer 
and it could be argued that the acquirer’s bidding behavior might be correlated with its CSR 
characteristics. We alleviate this concern by 1) including the bid premium in our model and 2) 
showing that the bid premium is not correlated with CSR as evidenced in Table 417. 
 Another potential concern would be that of CSR being a proxy for management 
quality. To address this omitted variable concern, we explicitly include proxies of 
management quality in our regression, namely Tobin’s Q and previous market-adjusted return 
(Deng et al., 2013; Lang et al., 1989). To make sure CSR does not proxy for other financial 
characteristics and does not result from the availability of limited resources (Sun and Gunia, 
2018), our model also includes measures of performance (ROA), investment (CAPEX and 
R&D), and advertising expenses. 
                                                          
16 We also tried replacing target’s CSR by the CSR difference between acquirer and target. Results are similar in 
that only acquirer’s CSR impacts arbitrage spreads. They are available upon request. 
17 To confirm this fact in a multivariate context, we also regress the CSR of acquirers on the bid premium and the 
list of controls included in equation 3. The absence of association between CSR and the bid premium is 
confirmed. 
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 One could also argue that managers may opportunistically invest in CSR activities in 
order to improve their odds of being successful acquirers, raising the issue of reverse 
causality. However, because acquiring CSR capabilities is a lengthy and complicated process, 
investing in CSR for the sole purpose of increasing the probability of deal completion would 
probably be a valid consideration for frequent acquirers only. In order to address these 
concerns, we repeat our analysis excluding serial acquirers from our sample18. Specifically, we 
follow Billett and Qian (2008) and define serial acquirers as firms that acquire at least two 
targets within any five-year horizon. There are 114 such firms in our sample and their 
exclusion therefore reduces our sample to 612 observations. We report the results in Table 9. 
We see that the removal of serial acquirers does not alter our previous conclusions in that 
CSR scores (overall and by dimensions) are negatively related to arbitrage spreads. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
To further address potential endogeneity problems, we also estimate instrumental variable 
regressions (two-stage-least-squares or 2SLS). In the first stage, we estimate ordinary least 
square regressions to predict the value of AcqCSR, AcqENV, AcqSOC and AcqGOV, i.e., we 
regress our CSR measure on explanatory variables used in Equation 3 and on two 
instrumental variables. For the choice of instruments, we base our work on Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2012) who show that CSR is determined by both country and industry 
characteristics. More precisely, a firm’s CSR is impacted by a time-invariant component 
associated with its membership in the country-industry pair, and a time-varying component at 
the country level (Cheng et al., 2014). In other words, a firm’s CSR is impacted by the CSR of 
                                                          
18 Removing serial acquirers also solves the potential issue of deals dependences within the same firms. 
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other firms within the same industry-country pair, and by the CSR of other firms in the same 
country over time. We follow Cheng et al. (2014), Arouri and Pijourlet (2017), and Gomes and 
Marsat (2018), and use as instruments the country-year mean of CSR scores and the country-
industry mean of CSR scores, computed using the entire ASSET4 ESG database.  To further 
support our choice of instruments, in each 2SLS regressions we perform the following two 
tests: (1) a Cragg and Donald (1993) instrument relevance test to ensure the relevance of our 
instruments (i.e., high correlations between the instruments and adjusted CSR), and (2) a 
Sargan (1958) overidentification test to investigate the exogeneity of our instruments (i.e., no 
significant correlation between the instruments and the residuals in the arbitrage spread 
regressions)19. Results are presented in Table 10. 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
In the first-stage regressions reported in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7, we see that both instruments 
are statistically significant, which seems to validate their use. In the second-stage regressions, 
we substitute the predicted values of our CSR measures for the actual CSR scores and report 
results in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. These results confirm our previous findings in that the 
predicted values of our CSR measures for overall, environment, social, and governance 
performance are negatively associated with arbitrage spreads at usual significance levels.  
 
 
                                                          
19 In unreported results, we control for potential self-selection bias by following the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
procedure. Indeed, Firms with certain characteristics could choose to become high-CSR firms. Specifically, in the 
first stage, we run a Probit regression in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm’s CSR is higher 
than the sample median and zero otherwise and the independent variables are the instrumental and control 
variables used in Tables 6 and 10. In the second stage, we estimate an ordinary least square (OLS) regression of 
arbitrage spreads on acquirer’s CSR, the inverse Mills ratio and the control variables used in Table 6. Results 
remain qualitatively similar, indicating that self-selection bias is unlikely to affect our findings. 
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4.5. Discussion 
Overall, our results suggest that high CSR by the acquirer tends to reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding mergers and acquisitions and leads to narrower arbitrage spreads. In accordance 
with the stakeholder view, one could explain this fact by arguing that strong CSR attributes 
possibly reduce the probability of a breach in implicit contracts, and increase stakeholders’ 
support towards a firm. More specifically, this reduction in M&A perceived uncertainty may 
come from four sources. First, we argue that target firms’ stakeholders are less likely to 
oppose the acquisition attempt if it comes from a socially responsible firm, because of the 
increased reputation associated with corporate social performance (Martinez-Ferrero et al., 
2016)20. Indeed, a M&A attempted by a socially irresponsible firm could lead target’s 
stakeholders to protest and lobby against the takeover, and this lobbying pressure could in 
turn potentially convince the board to consider alternatives to the takeover (Liang et al., 
2017). In addition, negative reputation spillovers coming from a low-CSR acquirer would 
potentially decrease the value of the target firm relative to other acquirers with better CSR 
credentials (Boone and Uysal, 2018), and the target firm should therefore be more inclined to 
oppose a M&A attempt coming from a low CSR bidder. Strong CSR by the acquirer should 
therefore lead to a reduced probability of target resistance. Second, we also explain the 
impact of CSR on M&A uncertainty by the reduction of conflict-of-interest risk between 
shareholders and other stakeholders, which facilitates the acquisition process and leads to 
faster integration (Deng et al., 2013). Indeed, a strong CSR performance is often associated 
with a stronger commitment to explicit and implicit contracts with key stakeholders (Deng et 
al., 2013; Liang et al., 2017). This stronger commitment to explicit and implicit contracts has 
                                                          
20 This result is confirmed within our sample. Using Fortune’s World’s most admired companies ranking, we find 
that firms present in the index feature a CSR score which is 17% higher on average, compared with firms which 
are not present in the index. Results are not reported for the sake of brevity but are available upon request. 
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an impact on the wealth gains of acquiring firms’ shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; 
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008; Masulis et al., 2016; Liang et al., 2017). As a result, 
acquirers’ shareholders should be less likely to oppose deals conducted by high CSR firms. 
Third, we argue that CSR reduces M&A completion uncertainty through its impact on deal 
financing, as empirical studies have shown that a strong CSR commitment leads to a lower 
cost of equity capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 
2016), a lower cost of debt (Goss and Roberts, 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2014)21, and an easier 
access to finance (Cheng et al., 2014). As a result, M&A operations conducted by high-CSR 
firms should embed less financing uncertainty. Fourth, a strong CSR commitment could 
potentially improve a firm’s image among regulators (Hong and Liskovich, 2015) and reduce 
the probability of regulatory intervention during the M&A process.  
We also show that the negative impact of acquirer’s CSR on deal uncertainty does not 
depend upon the CSR credentials of target firms. 
 Finally, our study interestingly complements the findings of Deng et al. (2013) in that 
we find the negative link between CSR and M&A completion risk holds internationally. Our 
study confirms this reduction in M&A completion risk associated with strong CSR is priced by 
market participants before deal conclusion, ruling out a potential anomaly in the conditional 
pricing of targets. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we conduct the first international study on the impact of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) on Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A)completion uncertainty as measured by 
                                                          
21 Our sample also confirms this relationship. High CSR acquirers (see definition in section 4.1.) have a weighted 
average cost of capital that is 2.1 percentage points lower on average than Low CSR acquirers. Results are not 
reported for the sake of brevity but are available upon request. 
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arbitrage spreads. We rely on the literature on CSR and develop two competing views 
(shareholder view vs. stakeholder view) about the effect of an acquirer’s CSR on M&A 
uncertainty. The shareholder view suggests that high-CSR acquirers should face higher 
uncertainty when conducting acquisitions; as a result, M&As undertaken by high-CSR 
acquirers should be characterized by wider arbitrage spreads. In contrast, the stakeholder 
view predicts that high-CSR acquirers should be more capable of quickly and successfully 
completing M&As; therefore, M&As undertaken by high-CSR acquirers should be 
characterized by less uncertainty and narrower arbitrage spreads. 
 Using an international sample of 726 deals announced between 2004 and 2016 and 
controlling for other determinants previously identified in the literature, we find that deals 
conducted by firms with strong CSR are associated with lower uncertainty as evidenced by 
narrower arbitrage spreads. This empirical result is consistent with the stakeholder view. In 
addition, we also examine the individual impact of each CSR dimension (Environment, Social, 
and Governance) and find that performance in all dimensions is negatively associated with 
M&A uncertainty. Our results demonstrate robustness in terms of alternative measures of 
arbitrage spreads as well as different sample specifications. In addition, we show that the 
negative impact of acquirer’s CSR on deal uncertainty holds regardless of the CSR 
performance of the target. We also show our results are not affected by endogeneity bias. 
 Overall, our findings contribute to the M&A and CSR literatures by showing how CSR 
influences the way markets assess the expected outcome of M&As. We show that CSR is an 
important determinant of the perceived risk surrounding M&A operations.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Description of variables 
Variable Description Expected sign 
ArbSpread Arbitrage spread one day after announcement. It is computed for cash and stock deals as 
per equations 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Bid premium Following Jindra and Walkling (2004), we compute the bid premium as follows: Bid premium 
= (offer price – average price before bid) / average price before bid. Average price before bid 
is computed from t – 30 to t – 10 relative to the announcement date. 
 
+ 
CumRet Following Jindra and Walkling (2004), we measure cumulative return as the target’s stock 
price return from t – 42 to t – 1 relative to announcement date. 
- 
AbnVol Cumulative abnormal trading volume around acquisition announcements using Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen’s method (1990): 
 
 
where normal volume is the average trading volume between t – 50 and t – 25 relative to 
announcement date. 
- 
TarSize  Natural logarithm of target’s market value + 
AcqSize Natural logarithm of acquirer’s market value - 
TarMTB Market-to-Book ratio of the target. - 
AcqQ Tobin’s Q of the acquirer. - 
AcqAR Acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal return estimated using 200 trading days of return data 
ending 11 before deal announcement (as in Deng et al., 2013). Given our international 
dataset, the market return used is the return on the primary stock market of the country in 
which the firm’s headquarter is located (as in Liang et al., 2017). 
- 
AcqROA Return on asset of the acquirer. +/- 
AcqCAPEX Acquirer’s capital expenditures scaled by total assets. +/- 
AcqCF Acquirer’s cash flow (FFO) scaled by total assets. +/- 
AcqLev Acquirer’s debt-to-total assets ratio. +/- 
AcqRD Acquirer’s research and development expenses scaled by total assets. +/- 
AcqAdv Acquirer’s advertising expenses (from Factset) scaled by total assets. +/- 
AcqAge Acquiring firm’s age +/- 
Cash Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the form of consideration is cash-only, 
and zero otherwise. 
- 
Hostile Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the takeover attempt is considered 
hostile, and zero otherwise. 
+/- 
Cross border Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the deal involves a target and an acquirer 
coming from two different countries, and zero otherwise. 
+ 
Diversifying Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer and the target have different 
first two-digit standard industrial classification codes and zero otherwise. 
+ 
Toehold Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the acquirer holds at least 5% of the target 
shares prior to the announcement and zero otherwise. 
- 
Multiple bids Dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is more than one acquirer and zero 
otherwise. 
- 
Table A1 reports the description of the control variables used in our multivariate regressions as well as the sign of their predicted 
relationship with arbitrage spreads. All variables whose timing is not mentioned are the latest available data before deal announcement. 
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Table 1: Average speculation spreads over the sample period 
Year Number of 
deal offers 
Average 
arbitrage spread 
(%) 
% of cases with negative 
arbitrage spreads 
Number of 
successful 
deals 
Number of 
cash deals 
Number of 
hostile deals 
Number of cross-
border deals 
2004 6 10.90 16.67 1 1 1 1 
2005 9 2.88 11.11 7 5 0 4 
2006 36 3.28 30.56 26 21 4 16 
2007 40 3.24 37.50 30 24 4 25 
2008 39 5.14 23.08 25 25 5 18 
2009 28 4.89 21.43 21 15 2 11 
2010 63 2.34 38.10 48 33 3 27 
2011 68 3.61 29.41 56 47 4 25 
2012 84 4.43 15.48 68 54 1 33 
2013 64 3.94 23.44 49 40 0 21 
2014 88 3.28 25.00 65 50 2 35 
2015 152 4.50 20.39 104 74 17 54 
2016 49 2.62 20.41 28 28 4 16 
Total 726 3.73 24.93 529 417 47 286 
Table 1 reports average arbitrage spreads and number of deal offers over the sample period. See Equations (1) and (2) for the calculation of 
the arbitrage spread. Our sample includes 726 deal offers announced between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2016. Arbitrage spreads 
are computed one day after deal announcement. 
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Table 2: Deal offers by acquirer and target countries 
Acquirer Target 
 Domestic deals Cross-border 
deals 
All deals  Domestic deals Cross-border 
deals 
All deals 
 # Value 
(US$M) 
# Value 
(US$M) 
# Value 
(US$M)  
# Value 
(US$M) 
# Value 
(US$M) 
# Value 
(US$M) 
USA 237 2,048,496 57 388,791 294 2,437,287 USA 237 2,048,496 88 598,475 325 2,646,970 
Canada 41 61,768 27 131,666 68 193,435 Australia 49 80,546 35 76,904 84 157,450 
UK 24 77,719 43 349,085 67 426,804 Canada 41 61,768 31 111,584 72 173,352 
Australia 49 80,546 6 147,598 55 228,143 UK 24 77,719 39 423,701 63 501,420 
Japan 27 77,115 27 60,472 54 137,588 Japan 27 77,115 2 17,234 29 94,350 
France 10 12,629 21 186,019 28 198,648 France 10 12,629 7 23,108 17 35,737 
Germany 7 62,678 17 109,898 24 172,575 South Africa 9 3,422 3 4,183 12 7,605 
Switzerland 5 67,400 13 56,193 18 123,593 Switzerland 5 67,400 7 62,194 12 129,593 
Spain 3 3,109 13 63,011 16 66,120 Netherlands 2 7,624 9 137,087 11 144,712 
South Africa 9 3,422 2 2,309 11 5,732 Germany 7 62,678 2 9,488 9 72,166 
Netherlands 2 7,624 7 40,514 9 48,138 Sweden 1 60 8 56,864 9 56,923 
China 0 0 8 12,798 8 12,798 Italy 3 67,250 4 11,773 7 79,022 
Ireland 0 0 7 48,768 7 48,768 Spain 3 3,109 4 27,150 7 30,259 
Italy 3 67,250 3 14,007 6 81,257 Ireland 0 0 6 105,426 6 105,426 
Hong Kong 2 7,396 3 5,405 5 12,800 Israel 0 0 5 2,833 5 2,833 
India 2 4,006 3 1,400 5 5,405 South Korea 3 7,916 2 6,504 5 14,420 
Norway 2 1,741 3 4,648 5 6,389 India 2 4,006 2 3,600 4 7,606 
South Korea 3 7,916 2 13,891 5 21,809 Norway 2 1,741 2 4,650 4 6,391 
Singapore 0 0 4 13,373 4 13,373 Taiwan 4 3,356 0 0 4 3,356 
Taiwan 4 3,356 0 0 4 3,356 Brazil 1 1,143 2 4,149 3 5,292 
Brazil 1 1,143 2 10,540 3 11,683 Hong Kong 2 7,396 1 1,472 3 8,868 
Other (15) 9 27,147 18 109,918 19 137,066 Other (22) 8 27,088 27 81,925 35 109,012 
              
Total 440 2,622,462 286 1,770,302 726 4,392,764  440 2,622,462 286 1,770,302 726 4,392,764 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on all attempted domestic and cross-border deals along with information on deal values. The deal offers 
are listed by country of origin of the target and acquirer. The data are obtained from the SDC database. Reported values are denominated in 
US dollars (not adjusted for inflation). # indicates the number of deals. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Observations Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Standard 
Deviation 
ArbSpread 726 0.037 0.001 0.022 0.071 0.080 
AcqCSR 726 0.599 0.391 0.635 0.821 0.240 
AcqENV 726 0.577 0.234 0.667 0.905 0.323 
AcqSOC 726 0.587 0.290 0.662 0.877 0.308 
AcqGOV 726 0.633 0.450 0.723 0.855 0.267 
BidPremium 726 0.343 0.175 0.300 0.455 0.329 
CumRet 726 0.080 -0.030 0.060 0.175 0.208 
AbnVol 726 24.513 3.430 14.603 39.796 67.942 
TarSize 726 7.085 5.857 7.236 8.351 1.854 
AcqSize 726 9.210 8.162 9.172 10.310 1.467 
TarMTB 726 2.037 1.152 1.915 3.255 15.849 
AcqQ 726 1.755 1.267 1.700 1.896 0.767 
AcqAR 726 0.147 -0.055 0.001 0.156 1.925 
AcqROA 726 0.062 0.022 0.059 0.099 0.084 
AcqCAPEX 726 0.043 0.010 0.026 0.055 0.059 
AcqCF 726 0.102 0.050 0.096 0.139 0.082 
AcqLev 726 0.240 0.108 0.215 0.343 0.175 
AcqRD 726 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.043 
AcqAdv 726 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 
AcqAge 726 55.844 22.000 38.000 79.000 48.842 
Cash 726 0.574 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.495 
Hostile 726 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.246 
Cross border 726 0.394 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.489 
Diversifying 726 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.389 
Toehold 726 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.273 
Multiple bids 726 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.305 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for our sample. The sample consists of 726 deal offers initiated between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2016. ArbSpread represents 
the arbitrage spreads one day after announcement. See Equations (1) and (2) for the calculation of the arbitrage spread. AcqCSR is the acquirer’s overall CSR score. AcqENV is 
an environmental score. AcqSOC is a social score. AcqGOV is a governance score. BidPremium is the percentage difference between the offer price and the target’s average 
price between t-30 to t-10 relative to announcement date. CumRet is the cumulative target’s stock price return from t – 42 to t – 1 relative to announcement date. AbnVol is 
abnormal trading volume around acquisition announcements (from t-1 to t+1). AcqSize is the acquirer’s market value. TarSize is the target’s market value. TarMTB is the 
targets’ market-to-book ratio. AcqQ is the acquirers’ Tobin’s Q. AcqAR is the acquirers’ market-adjusted return. AcqROA is the acquirer’s return on asset. AcqCAPEX 
represents the acquirer’s capital expenditures scaled by total assets. AcqCF is the acquirer’s cash flow scaled by total assets. AcqLev is the acquirer’s debt-to-asset ratio. 
AcqRD is the acquirer’s research and development expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAdv is the acquirer’s advertising expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAge is the 
acquiring firm’s age. Cash is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for purely cash-financed deals, and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one for hostile bids, and zero otherwise. Cross border is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the acquirer and the target are not in the same country, and zero 
otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit standard industrial classification codes and 
zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the acquirer holds at least 5% of the target shares prior to the announcement and zero otherwise.  
Multiple bids is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is more than one acquirer and zero otherwise. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1 ArbSpread 1.000                          
2 AcqCSR -0.136 1.000                         
3 AcqENV -0.135 0.888 1.000                        
4 AcqSOC -0.115 0.906 0.844 1.000                       
5 AcqGOV -0.070 0.581 0.214 0.272 1.000                      
6 Bid premium 0.169 0.042 0.030 0.046 0.020 1.000                     
7 CumRet -0.150 0.004 0.039 -0.004 -0.034 0.189 1.000                    
8 AbnVol (x100) -0.071 0.122 0.092 0.098 0.106 0.256 0.007 1.000                   
9 AcqSize -0.133 0.407 0.390 0.400 0.202 -0.033 0.053 -0.017 1.000                  
10 TarSize 0.053 0.236 0.196 0.215 0.154 -0.350 -0.071 -0.151 0.381 1.000                 
11 TarMTB 0.068 0.010 -0.007 0.012 0.023 0.021 0.012 -0.056 0.078 0.042 1.000                
12 AcqQ 0.044 -0.032 -0.110 -0.058 0.115 0.121 0.026 -0.027 0.148 0.060 0.151 1.000               
13 AcqAR -0.020 -0.038 -0.033 -0.015 -0.046 -0.084 0.146 -0.088 -0.037 0.027 0.068 0.007 1.000              
14 AcqROA 0.024 0.107 0.103 0.096 0.056 0.077 0.032 0.048 0.244 0.207 0.088 0.381 -0.082 1.000             
15 AcqCAPEX 0.089 -0.009 -0.014 -0.033 0.034 0.101 0.026 0.008 -0.211 -0.127 -0.036 0.051 -0.017 0.077 1.000            
16 AcqCF 0.066 0.159 0.109 0.121 0.160 0.182 0.023 0.046 0.092 0.028 0.089 0.449 -0.044 0.405 0.347 1.000           
17 AcqLev -0.045 0.051 0.068 0.041 0.010 -0.211 -0.111 -0.043 0.029 0.136 0.044 -0.147 0.099 -0.139 0.005 -0.179 1.000          
18 AcqRD -0.039 0.079 0.085 0.090 0.006 0.102 0.093 -0.015 0.127 0.017 0.147 0.433 0.028 0.200 -0.120 0.325 -0.170 1.000         
19 AcqAdv -0.022 -0.011 0.093 0.052 -0.201 0.021 -0.018 0.042 0.024 0.011 -0.023 -0.015 -0.018 0.020 0.018 0.032 -0.086 0.081 1.000        
20 AcqAge -0.054 0.349 0.373 0.382 0.085 0.014 0.000 0.102 0.301 0.156 -0.046 -0.118 -0.010 0.019 -0.136 -0.033 0.041 0.045 0.102 1.000       
21 Cash -0.247 0.167 0.245 0.200 -0.077 0.211 0.109 0.227 0.225 -0.245 -0.008 0.054 0.036 0.071 -0.088 0.106 -0.043 0.132 0.075 0.148 1.000      
22 Hostile -0.062 -0.031 -0.036 -0.038 0.003 -0.086 -0.006 -0.089 -0.005 0.076 -0.022 0.018 0.034 0.001 -0.033 -0.043 0.072 -0.013 -0.019 -0.015 -0.023 1.000     
23 Cross border -0.083 0.153 0.226 0.212 -0.104 0.071 0.082 0.054 0.193 0.079 0.010 0.029 0.041 0.114 -0.051 0.056 -0.055 0.047 0.084 0.159 0.238 0.074 1.000    
24 Diversifying -0.039 0.039 0.045 0.050 -0.007 -0.020 0.002 0.037 -0.018 -0.023 0.004 -0.014 -0.069 -0.047 -0.083 -0.082 0.059 0.008 -0.061 0.030 0.025 0.018 0.035 1.000   
25 Toehold -0.078 -0.006 0.035 0.000 -0.059 -0.088 -0.050 -0.026 -0.023 -0.072 -0.058 -0.078 0.006 -0.020 0.054 -0.053 0.053 -0.079 -0.008 0.018 0.011 0.127 0.059 0.013 1.000  
26 Multiple bids -0.118 -0.032 -0.060 -0.048 0.041 -0.074 0.148 -0.029 -0.067 -0.007 -0.056 0.076 0.048 0.078 0.020 0.051 -0.031 -0.015 -0.030 -0.007 0.036 0.131 0.032 -0.011 0.048 1.000 
Table 4 reports correlation coefficients between variables for our sample. ArbSpread represents the arbitrage spreads one day after announcement. See Equations (1) and (2) for the calculation of the arbitrage spread. 
AcqCSR is acquirers’ last available CSR score before announcement. AcqENV is an environmental score. AcqSOC is a social score. AcqGOV is a governance score. Bid premium is the percentage difference between the 
offer price and the target’s average price between t-30 to t-10 relative to announcement date. CumRet is the cumulative target’s stock price return from t – 42 to t – 1 relative to announcement date. AbnVol is 
abnormal trading volume around acquisition announcements (from t-1 to t+1). AcqSize is the acquirer’s market value. TarSize is the target’s market value. TarMTB is the targets’ market-to-book ratio. AcqQ is the 
acquirers’ Tobin’s Q. AcqAR is the acquirers’ market-adjusted return. AcqROA is the acquirer’s return on asset. AcqCAPEX represents the acquirer’s capital expenditures scaled by total assets. AcqCF is the acquirer’s 
cash flow scaled by total assets. AcqLev is the acquirer’s debt-to-asset ratio. AcqRD is the acquirer’s research and development expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAdv is the acquirer’s advertising expenses scaled by 
total assets. AcqAge is the acquiring firm’s age. Cash is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for purely cash-financed deals, and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for hostile 
bids, and zero otherwise. Cross border is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the acquirer and the target are not in the same country, and zero otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit standard industrial classification codes and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the acquirer holds at least 5% 
of the target shares prior to the announcement and zero otherwise.  Multiple bids is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is more than one acquirer and zero otherwise. All financial variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Bold denoted significance at the 5% level or lower. 
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Table 5: Acquirer’s CSR and arbitrage spreads 
 Dependent variable: ArbSpread 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CSR Environment Social Governance 
Constant 0.083** 0.088** 0.078* 0.098** 
 (2.07) (2.20) (1.92) (2.48) 
AcqCSR -0.046*** -0.026** -0.030** -0.028** 
 (-2.92) (-2.13) (-2.31) (-2.29) 
Bid premium 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 
 (6.64) (6.56) (6.65) (6.50) 
CumRet -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.058*** -0.056*** 
 (-3.83) (-3.69) (-3.85) (-3.74) 
AbnVol (x100) -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
 (1.22) (-1.42) (-1.43) (-1.21) 
AcqSize -0.006** -0.007*** -0.007** -0.008*** 
 (-2.09) (-2.62) (-2.42) (-3.17) 
TarSize 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (3.74) (3.69) (3.69) (3.60) 
TarMTB 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (2.08) (2.03) (2.08) (2.10) 
AcqQ 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 
 (0.52) (0.50) (0.60) (1.07) 
AcqAR 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 
 (0.83) (0.74) (0.88) (0.87) 
AcqROA -0.012 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.20) (0.05) (-0.08) (-0.08) 
AcqCAPEX 0.100 0.110 0.102 0.093 
 (1.23) (1.35) (1.26) (1.14) 
AcqCF 0.093 0.073 0.080 0.071 
 (1.22) (0.97) (1.06) (0.95) 
AcqLev -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.03) (-0.06) (-0.08) (-0.15) 
AcqRD -0.090 -0.099 -0.087 -0.111 
 (-0.89) (-0.97) (-0.85) (-1.10) 
AcqAdv -0.134 -0.042 -0.070 -0.196 
 (-0.45) (-0.14) (-0.24) (-0.65) 
AcqAge 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.28) 1.03 (1.15) (0.61) 
Cash -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.026*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.38) (-3.53) (-3.71) 
Hostile -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.013* 
 (-1.73) (-1.76) (-1.75) (-1.74) 
Cross border -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
 (-0.94) (-0.78) (-0.83) (-1.15) 
Diversifying 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (0.47) (0.51) (0.47) (0.33) 
Toehold -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
 (-1.15) (-1.06) (-1.15) (-1.06) 
Multiple bids -0.022** -0.023** -0.022** -0.020** 
 (-2.25) (-2.36) (-2.33) (-2.13) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 726 726 726 726 
Adj-R² 0.175 0.170 0.171 0.171 
The dependent variable represents the arbitrage spread one day after announcement. See Equations (1) and (2) for the calculation of the arbitrage spread. 
AcqCSR is the acquirer’s overall CSR score in column 1, the environmental score in column 2, the social score in column 3 and the governance score in column 4. 
Bid premium is the percentage difference between the offer price and the target’s average price between t-30 to t-10 relative to announcement date. CumRet is 
the cumulative target’s stock price return from t – 42 to t – 1 relative to announcement date. AbnVol is abnormal trading volume around acquisition 
announcements (from t-1 to t+1). AcqSize is the acquirer’s market value. TarSize is the target’s market value. TarMTB is the targets’ market-to-book ratio. AcqQi 
is the acquirers’ Tobin’s Q. AcqAR is the acquirers’ market-adjusted return. AcqROA is the acquirer’s return on asset. AcqCAPEX represents the acquirer’s capital 
expenditures scaled by total assets. AcqCF is the acquirer’s cash flow scaled by total assets. AcqLev is the acquirer’s debt-to-asset ratio. AcqRD is the acquirer’s 
research and development expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAdv is the acquirer’s advertising expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAge is the acquiring firm’s 
age. Cash is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for purely cash-financed deals, and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
for hostile bids, and zero otherwise. Cross border is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the acquirer and the target are not in the same country, 
and zero otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit standard industrial 
classification codes and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the acquirer holds at least 5% of the target shares prior to the 
announcement and zero otherwise.  Multiple bids is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is more than one acquirer and zero otherwise. 
Regressions include country, industry and year fixed effects. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6: Acquirer’s CSR and likelihood of deal success 
 Probit regression 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CSR Environment Social Governance 
Constant -1.917** -1.891** -1.886** -1.908** 
AcqCSR 0.354** 0.347** 0.325** -0.018 
 [9.34] [9.10] [8.88] [-0.49] 
Bid premium 0.166 0.177 0.159 0.167 
 [4.36] [4.65] [4.18] [4.40] 
CumRet -0.300 -0.296 -0.294 -0.298 
 [-7.62] [-7.52] [-7.47] [-7.56] 
AbnVol (x100) 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005*** 
 [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14] 
AcqSize 0.253*** 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.257*** 
 [6.42] [6.21] [6.22] [6.53] 
TarSize -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.171*** 
 [-4.36] [-4.37] [-4.37] [-4.36] 
TarMTB 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 [0.26] [0.26] [0.26] [0.26] 
AcqQ -0.138 -0.132 -0.134 -0.131 
 [-3.50] [-3.37] [-3.40] [-3.33] 
AcqAR -0.388* -0.387* -0.388* -0.393* 
 [-9.87] [-9.84] [-9.87] [-9.98] 
AcqROA -1.532 -1.481 -1.477 -1.667 
 [-38.96] [-37.67] [-37.58] [-42.35] 
AcqCAPEX 2.183 2.161 2.167 2.151 
 [55.52] [54.97] [55.12] [54.64] 
AcqCF 1.981 1.898 1.899 2.147 
 [50.37] [48.29] [48.29] [54.54] 
AcqLev 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 
 [0.14] [-0.02] [-0.01] [-0.17] 
AcqRD 2.387 2.353 2.361 2.230 
 [60.71] [59.87] [60.05] [56.63] 
AcqAdv 4.979 4.964 4.991 4.214 
 [126.62] [126.27] [126.96] [107.04] 
AcqAge 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Cash 0.265** 0.252** 0.262** 0.280** 
 [6.97] [6.63] [6.88] [7.38] 
Hostile -1.445*** -1.446*** -1.446*** -1.439*** 
 [-36.74] [-36.80] [-36.79] [-36.56] 
Cross border 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 
 [0.00] [-0.05] [-0.04] [-0.18] 
Diversifying -0.034 -0.038 -0.038 -0.032 
 [-0.86] [-0.96] [-0.96] [-0.81] 
Toehold 0.297* 0.300* 0.301* 0.295* 
 [7.57] [7.64] [7.67] [7.49] 
Multiple bids -1.060*** -1.061*** -1.062*** -1.048*** 
 [-26.97] [-26.99] [-27.01] [-26.63] 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 726 726 726 726 
Pseudo-R² 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223 
Table 7 reports the results of Probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is completed and zero otherwise. AcqCSR 
is the acquirer’s overall CSR score in column 1, the environmental score in column 2, the social score in column 3 and the governance score in column 4. Bid 
premium is the percentage difference between the offer price and the target’s average price between t-30 to t-10 relative to announcement date. CumRet is the 
cumulative target’s stock price return from t – 42 to t – 1 relative to announcement date. AbnVol is abnormal trading volume around acquisition announcements 
(from t-1 to t+1). AcqSize is the acquirer’s market value. TarSize is the target’s market value. TarMTB is the targets’ market-to-book ratio. AcqQ is the acquirers’ 
Tobin’s Q. AcqAR is the acquirers’ market-adjusted return. AcqROA is the acquirer’s return on asset. AcqCAPEX represents the acquirer’s capital expenditures 
scaled by total assets. AcqCF is the acquirer’s cash flow scaled by total assets. AcqLev is the acquirer’s debt-to-asset ratio. AcqRD is the acquirer’s research and 
development expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAdv is the acquirer’s advertising expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAge is the acquiring firm’s age. Cash is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one for purely cash-financed deals, and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for hostile 
bids, and zero otherwise. Cross border is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the acquirer and the target are not in the same country, and zero 
otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit standard industrial 
classification codes and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the acquirer holds at least 5% of the target shares prior to the 
announcement and zero otherwise.  Multiple bids is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is more than one acquirer and zero otherwise. 
Regressions include country, industry and year fixed effects. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  The numbers in brackets are marginal 
effects expressed in percentage points. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 44 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis 
 Dependent variable: ArbSpread 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
 Arbitrage spread (t+2) Ex-crisis Ex-Financial Ex-Negative spreads Ex-US 
Constant 0.085** 0.083** 0.085* 0.135*** 0.089 
 (2.10) (2.06) (1.77) (3.50) (1.41) 
AcqCSR -0.038** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.043*** -0.067*** 
 (-2.32) (-3.09) (-2.95) (-2.74) (-3.37) 
Bid premium 0.075*** 0.084*** 0.073*** 0.049*** 0.099*** 
 (6.05) (6.59) (5.23) (3.89) (6.38) 
CumRet -0.062*** -0.048*** -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.038** 
 (-4.12) (-2.92) (-3.63) (-3.89) (-2.08) 
AbnVol (x100) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.33) (-0.80) (-0.79) (-1.36) (-1.10) 
AcqSize -0.006** -0.006** -0.006* -0.006** -0.007* 
 (-2.10) (-1.97) (-1.84) (-2.09) (-1.92) 
TarSize 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 
 (3.08) (3.77) (3.30) (3.46) (3.59) 
TarMTB 0.001* 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001** 
 (1.71) (2.41) (2.76) (0.76) (2.06) 
AcqQ 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.005 
 (0.40) (0.88) (0.30) (0.40) (0.81) 
AcqAR 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.001 -0.012 
 (1.01) (0.66) (0.66) (0.09) (-0.82) 
AcqROA -0.018 -0.021 -0.016 -0.050 -0.044 
 (-0.29) (-0.34) (-0.24) (-0.82) (-0.60) 
AcqCAPEX 0.085 0.105 0.125 0.082 0.088 
 (1.03) (1.28) (1.46) (1.00) (0.99) 
AcqCF 0.104 0.080 0.102 0.120 0.122 
 (1.35) (1.03) (1.22) (1.57) (1.31) 
AcqLev 0.012 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.023 
 (0.59) (0.23) (0.02) (0.24) (0.86) 
AcqRD -0.114 -0.016 -0.082 0.100 -0.129 
 (-1.11) (-0.14) (-0.78) (0.93) (-0.89) 
AcqAdv -0.006 -0.323 -0.138 -0.340 -0.179 
 (-0.02) (-1.04) (-0.47) (-1.11) (-0.75) 
AcqAge 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 -0.001 
 (1.26) (1.63) (1.92) (1.32) (-0.07) 
Cash -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.023** 
 (-3.69) (-3.48) (-3.13) (-5.12) (-2.45) 
Hostile -0.019* -0.018* -0.022* 0.017 -0.002 
 (-1.89) (-1.72) (-1.68) (1.21) (-0.15) 
Cross border -0.007 -0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.013 
 (-1.06) (-0.53) (-1.42) (0.40) (-1.58) 
Diversifying 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.010 
 (0.63) (0.49) (1.08) (0.05) (0.87) 
Toehold -0.003 -0.009 -0.015 -0.016 -0.005 
 (-0.28) (-0.82) (-1.23) (-1.37) (-0.48) 
Multiple bids -0.022** -0.029*** -0.023** 0.003 -0.026** 
 (-2.24) (-2.84) (-2.18) (0.24) (-2.21) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 726 670 604 545 489 
Adj-R² 0.164 0.187 0.183 0.238 0.194 
In column 1, our dependent variable is the arbitrage spread two day after announcement. See Equations (1) and (2) for the calculation of the 
arbitrage spread. In column 2, we restrict our sample to the non-crisis period. In column 3, we restrict our sample to non-financial firms. In 
column 4, we restrict our sample to deals exhibiting positive arbitrage spreads. In column 5, we restrict our sample to non-US deals. Control 
variables are the same as in Equation 3 and coefficients associated with them are not reported for the sake of brevity. Regressions include 
country, industry and year fixed effects. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 8: Acquirer’s CSR and arbitrage spreads (accounting for target’s CSR) 
 Dependent variable: ArbSpread 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CSR Environment Social Governance 
Constant 0.111* 0.117* 0.104 0.134** 
 (1.70) (1.80) (1.54) (2.05) 
AcqCSR -0.056** -0.023** -0.042** -0.037* 
 (-2.29) (-1.97) (-2.10) (-1.93) 
TarCSR -0.002 -0.017 0.013 0.006 
 (-0.08) (-1.09) (0.77) (0.32) 
Bid premium 0.183*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
 (7.31) (7.27) (7.30) (7.30) 
CumRet -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.107*** 
 (-4.43) (-4.37) (-4.44) (-4.41) 
AbnVol (x100) -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** 
 (-1.92) (-2.01) (-1.77) (-2.00) 
AcqSize -0.010** -0.012*** -0.010** -0.012*** 
 (-2.11) (-2.72) (-2.31) (-2.79) 
TarSize 0.012** 0.014*** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (2.46) (2.86) (2.30) (2.42) 
TarMTB 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.25) (1.21) (1.25) (1.26) 
AcqQ 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.44) (0.77) 
AcqAR 0.022 0.018 0.023 0.024 
 (1.21) (1.00) (1.25) (1.29) 
AcqROA -0.107 -0.095 -0.110 -0.101 
 (-1.03) (-0.92) (-1.05) (-0.97) 
AcqCAPEX -0.042 -0.030 -0.030 -0.064 
 (-0.30) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.47) 
AcqCF 0.120 0.087 0.120 0.089 
 (0.98) (0.72) (0.98) (0.74) 
AcqLev 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.11) (0.02) 
AcqRD 0.013 0.017 0.036 -0.020 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.19) (-0.11) 
AcqAdv -0.145 -0.043 -0.056 -0.273 
 (-0.24) (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.44) 
AcqAge 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.70) (0.56) (0.67) (0.23) 
Cash -0.020* -0.018* -0.021** -0.021** 
 (-1.94) (-1.76) (-2.01) (-2.07) 
Hostile -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 
 (-0.56) (-0.61) (-0.66) (-0.56) 
Cross border -0.014 -0.013 -0.011 -0.017* 
 (-1.51) (-1.40) (-1.24) (-1.82) 
Diversifying 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (0.55) (0.54) (0.49) (0.46) 
Toehold 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.005 
 (0.23) (0.52) (0.23) (0.33) 
Multiple bids -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 
 (-1.09) (-1.23) (-1.12) (-0.94) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 404 404 404 404 
Adj-R² 0.196 0.191 0.195 0.192 
The dependent variable represents the arbitrage spreads one day after announcement. See Equations (1) and (2) for the calculation of the arbitrage spread. 
AcqCSR is the acquirer’s overall CSR score in column 1, the environmental score in column 2, the social score in column 3 and the governance score in column 4. 
TarCSR is the target’s overall CSR score in column 1, the environmental score in column 2, the social score in column 3 and the governance score in column 4. Bid 
premium is the percentage difference between the offer price and the target’s average price between t-30 to t-10 relative to announcement date. CumRet is the 
cumulative target’s stock price return from t – 42 to t – 1 relative to announcement date. AbnVol is abnormal trading volume around acquisition announcements 
(from t-1 to t+1). AcqSize is the acquirer’s market value. TarSize is the target’s market value. TarMTB is the targets’ market-to-book ratio. AcqQi is the acquirers’ 
Tobin’s Q. AcqAR is the acquirers’ market-adjusted return. AcqROA is the acquirer’s return on asset. AcqCAPEX represents the acquirer’s capital expenditures 
scaled by total assets. AcqCF is the acquirer’s cash flow scaled by total assets. AcqLev is the acquirer’s debt-to-asset ratio. AcqRD is the acquirer’s research and 
development expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAdv is the acquirer’s advertising expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAge is the acquiring firm’s age. Cash is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one for purely cash-financed deals, and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for hostile 
bids, and zero otherwise. Cross border is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the acquirer and the target are not in the same country, and zero 
otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit standard industrial 
classification codes and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the acquirer holds at least 5% of the target shares prior to the 
announcement and zero otherwise.  Multiple bids is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is more than one acquirer and zero otherwise. 
Regressions include country, industry and year fixed effects. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 9: Acquirer’s CSR and arbitrage spreads (removing serial acquirers) 
 Dependent variable: ArbSpread 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CSR Environment Social Governance 
Constant 0.077* 0.081* 0.069 0.095** 
 (1.75) (1.84) (1.55) (2.18) 
AcqCSR -0.051*** -0.032** -0.033** -0.026* 
 (-2.80) (-2.30) (-2.19) (-1.95) 
Bid premium 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.092*** 
 (6.68) (6.64) (6.66) (6.49) 
CumRet -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.063*** 
 (-3.76) (-3.65) (-3.77) (-3.65) 
AbnVol (x100) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.31) (-1.50) (-1.42) (-1.39) 
AcqSize -0.006* -0.008** -0.007** -0.009*** 
 (-1.86) (-2.22) (-2.11) (-2.97) 
TarSize 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (3.29) (3.27) (3.27) (3.11) 
TarMTB 0.002** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002** 
 (2.56) (2.51) (2.59) (2.53) 
AcqQ 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 
 (0.63) (0.54) (0.71) (1.16) 
AcqAR 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.014 
 (1.02) (0.92) (1.09) (1.07) 
AcqROA -0.020 -0.004 -0.012 -0.010 
 (-0.29) (-0.05) (-0.18) (-0.14) 
AcqCAPEX 0.127 0.136 0.130 0.119 
 (1.38) (1.47) (1.40) (1.28) 
AcqCF 0.069 0.053 0.058 0.048 
 (0.84) (0.64) (0.69) (0.58) 
AcqLev -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
 (-0.32) (-0.36) (-0.40) (-0.39) 
AcqRD -0.107 -0.120 -0.105 -0.120 
 (-0.95) (-1.06) (-0.92) (-1.06) 
AcqAdv 0.041 0.161 0.122 -0.021 
 (0.11) (0.42) (0.32) (-0.05) 
AcqAge 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.84) (0..61) (0.67) (0.22) 
Cash -0.022*** -0.021** -0.021*** -0.023*** 
 (-2.75) (-2.57) (-2.69) (-2.87) 
Hostile -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.009 
 (-0.85) (-0.94) (-0.88) (-0.69) 
Cross border -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 
 (-0.96) (-0.81) (-0.87) (-1.08) 
Diversifying 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 
 (0.62) (0.65) (0.63) (0.46) 
Toehold -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 
 (-0.88) (-0.81) (-0.90) (-0.69) 
Multiple bids -0.019* -0.021* -0.020* -0.018* 
 (-1.79) (-1.90) (-1.86) (-1.67) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 612 612 612 612 
Adj-R² 0.165 0.161 0.160 0.158 
The dependent variable represents the arbitrage spread one day after announcement. See Equations (1) and (2) for the calculation of arbitrage spreads. AcqCSR 
is the acquirer’s overall CSR score in column 1, the environmental score in column 2, the social score in column 3 and the governance score in column 4. Bid 
premium is the percentage difference between the offer price and the target’s average price between t-30 to t-10 relative to announcement date. CumRet is the 
cumulative target’s stock price return from t – 42 to t – 1 relative to announcement date. AbnVol is abnormal trading volume around acquisition announcements 
(from t-1 to t+1). AcqSize is the acquirer’s market value. TarSize is the target’s market value. TarMTB is the targets’ market-to-book ratio. AcqQ is the acquirers’ 
Tobin’s Q. AcqAR is the acquirers’ market-adjusted return. AcqROA is the acquirer’s return on asset. AcqCAPEX represents the acquirer’s capital expenditures 
scaled by total assets. AcqCF is the acquirer’s cash flow scaled by total assets. AcqLev is the acquirer’s debt-to-asset ratio. AcqRD is the acquirer’s research and 
development expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAdv is the acquirer’s advertising expenses scaled by total assets. AcqAge is the acquiring firm’s age. Cash is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one for purely cash-financed deals, and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for hostile 
bids, and zero otherwise. Cross border is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the acquirer and the target are not in the same country, and zero 
otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit standard industrial 
classification codes and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the acquirer holds at least 5% of the target shares prior to the 
announcement and zero otherwise.  Multiple bids is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is more than one acquirer and zero otherwise. 
Regressions include country, industry and year fixed effects. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. The numbers in brackets are marginal 
effects expressed in percentage points. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 10: Instrumental Variables Estimations 
 CSR Environment Social Governance 
 First stage Second stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 0.090 0.123*** 0.311** 0.074** 0.046 0.077** 0.036 0.057** 
 (0.97) (3.85) (2.51) (2.02) (0.42) (2.02) (0.45) (2.20) 
AcqCSR_adj  -0.064**  -0.022**  -0.034**  -0.053*** 
  (-2.03)  (-1.99)  (-2.05)  (-3.29) 
Country-year CSR 0.498***  0.303***  0.397***  0.429***  
 (4.21)  (2.45)  (3.54)  (4.80)  
Country-industry CSR 0.528***  0.508***  0.477***  0.648***  
 (6.07)  (5.61)  (5.43)  (7.54)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage Cragg and 
Donald test 
p-value < 0.001  p-value < 0.001  p-value < 0.001  p-value < 0.001  
Sargan 
overidentification test 
 p-value = 0.637  p-value = 0.639  p-value = 0.872  p-value = 0.859 
Observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 
R² 0.528 0.311 0.535 0.294 0.567 0.297 0.727 0.306 
Table 10 presents our two-stage least square estimations. In the first stage, CSR scores (overall, environment, social, and governance) are regressed on two instruments, which are the country-year mean of CSR scores 
and the country-industry mean of CSR scores, computed using the entire ASSET4 ESG database. AcqCSR_adj is the predicted value of the overall CSR score in column 2, the environment score in column 4, the social 
score in column 6 and the governance score in column 8. Control variables are the same as in Equation 3 and coefficients associated with them are not reported for the sake of brevity. Regressions include country and 
year fixed effects. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
